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COURTS AND THE SECOND CONFLICTS RESTATEMENT:
SOME OBSERVATIONS AND AN EMPIRICAL NOTE
PATRICKJ. BORCHERS*
INTRODUCTION
As the name of this Symposium suggests, the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws' has been with us for a quarter of a century. In some
senses it has been around longer. The American Law Institute began
the endeavor in 19522 and approved it in May 1969.' In draft form,
the Second Restatement attracted early attention from courts, including
a prominent citation in the New York Court of Appeals pathbreaking
1963 Babcock v. Jackson4 decision. With good reason, Babcock is viewed
as the beginning of the conflicts revolution,' and, thus, the Second Re-
statement has been a prominent feature of the conflicts revolution
since the beginning.
Like the revolution itself, the project of re-restating American
conflicts law was controversial. Although the first Restatement of Con-
flict of Laws,' adopted in 1934, was under attack from its beginning,7 it
represented a synthesis of a stable, territorial, multilateral choice-of-
law system whose American roots dated at least to Justice Story's 1834
treatise,' and whose European ancestry predated Story by centuries. 9Even among those who favored modification or abandonment of the
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Albany Law School of Union University. B.S.,
University of Notre Dame; J.D., University of California, Davis.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
2. See Willis L.M. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 679, 680 (1963).
3. See W. Noel Keyes, The Restatement (Second): Its Misleading Quality and a Proposal for
Its Amelioration, 13 PEPP. L. Rv. 23, 38 (1985).
4. 191 N.E.2d 279, 282 (N.Y. 1963).
5. See, e.g., Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1212 (1963) (referring to Babcock as a repudiation of the traditional
rule); Symposium on Conflict of Laws: Celebrating the 30th Anniversary of Babcock v. Jackson, 56
ALB. L. Rv. 693, 694 (1993) (referring to Babcock as the "big bang" in conflicts law).
6. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1934).
7. See, e.g., David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173,
208 (1933) (stating that the First Restatement "elevate[s] certainty and uniformity above all
other objectives [of the choice-of-law] branch of the conflict of laws," thereby stifling fur-
ther inquiry and scholarship in the field).
8. SeeJOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834).
9. See FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAw AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 10-31 (1993).
1232
OBSERVATIONS ON THE SECOND RESTATEMENT
multilateral system embodied in the First Restatement, however, the Sec-
ond Restatement came in for criticism. 1°
Despite the slings and arrows launched toward it, the Second Re-
statement has risen to prominence. More than half of the states now
purport to follow it, while only a dozen follow its predecessor." Even
among states that follow some other choice-of-law approach, certain
provisions in the Second Restatement have proven influential.' 2 Thus, in
a sense, one could say that the Second Restatement now represents the
dominant American conflicts methodology.
But what does it mean to say that the Second Restatement is "domi-
nant"? What is it that courts actually do in "following" the Second Re-
statement? Does saying that a state is a Second Restatement jurisdiction
mean anything more than that it does not follow the First Restatement?
This Article suggests that the reason the Second Restatement has
attracted such a large following-in name, anyway-is its open-ended
general provisions."' Its general provisions are cited with considera-
ble frequency, while its more narrow, specific provisions are often ig-
nored, even in cases in which they offer explicit answers to the case at
hand.' 4 The result, which will surprise no one who has closely fol-
lowed American conflicts doctrine, is that citation to the Second Restate-
ment is often little more than a veil hiding judicial intuition.
The remedy this Article proposes is that courts nominally follow-
ing the Second Restatement should make an effort to follow the entire
document, including analysis of relevant specific provisions. To the
extent that courts wish to depart from the narrower, presumptive
rules contained in the Second Restatement, they should candidly set
forth their reasons for doing so. As Professor Leflar and others have
recognized, 1 5 courts have a strong preference for applying the better
10. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
11. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1995: A Year in
Review, 44 AM.J. COMP. L. 181, 195 (1996).
12. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stolarz, 613 N.E.2d 936, 939 (N.Y. 1993) (following
§ 188 of the Second Restatement while still adhering to the "center-of-gravity" approach to
resolve conflicts).
13. See infra tbl.I (documenting the frequency of citation to the general provisions of
the Second Restatement).
14. See infra tbls.II & III (documenting the frequency of citation to specific tort (tbl. II)
and contract (tbl.III) provisions of the Second Restatement).
15. See, e.g.,JUENGER, supra note 9, at 191-94 ("Openly or covertly, the better law princi-
ple now permeates case law, statutes and conventions."); Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influenc-
ing Laws in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 295-304 (1966) (stating that the most
important factor in conflicts is the application of the better rule of law); Luther A. McDou-
gal, III, Toward Application of the Best Rule of Law in Choice of Law Cases, 35 MERCER L. Rrv.
483, 512-14 (1984) (stating that courts should not stop with the better rule of law, but
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rule of law, especially in tort conflicts.' 6 Courts that find themselves
frequently departing from the narrower, presumptive rules should re-
consider their status as Second Restatement states.
If courts were either to follow the narrower, more specific rules in
the Second Restatement, or candidly state reasons for departing from
them, this would further important goals. First, this approach would
foster predictability. Predicting results based solely on the Second Re-
statement's general provisions is almost impossible, whereas the specific
provisions contain many relatively sensible rules. Second, this ap-
proach would promote judicial candor. To the extent that courts re-
ject the Second Restatement's guidance, they should say so forthrightly,
rather than bathing in the vast expanses of the Second Restatement's
open-ended general provisions. Certainly, those courts that routinely
deviate from the Second Restatement's specific provisions should recon-
sider their professed adherence to the document.
Part I of this Article considers the Second Restatement's guidance
and considers why the document has inspired the selective treatment
it receives from courts. Part II presents some data on the frequency
with which courts invoke Second Restatement provisions and shows that,
while the general provisions are frequently cited, the more narrow
provisions are rarely cited.
I. THE SECOND RESTATEM-EN-'S STRUCTURE
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws"7 is a strange docu-
ment. From a current perspective, the vigor with which the whole
project was attacked while in the drafting stage is surprising. Two of
the giants of that earlier era, Brainerd Currie and Albert Ehrenzweig,
should apply the best rule of law-the law that best serves the common interest-to resolve
choice-of-law cases).
16. See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721, 728 (Cal. 1978)
(in bank) (stating that the California rule is "archaic" and, thus, not to be applied); Bige-
low v. Halloran, 313 N.W.2d 10, 12-13 (Minn. 1981) (en banc) (concluding that the rule of
survival of tort liability is the better rule); Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277,
283 n.2 (N.Y. 1993) (describing that the New York rule of allowing contribution against
impleaded employers is clearly a minority rule and its imposition on "the carefully struc-
tured workers' compensation schemes of other States... is undesirable"); see also PatrickJ.
Borchers, Conflicts Pragmatism, 56 ALB. L. REv. 883, 905 (1993) (stating that the New York
Court of Appeals in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1961), applied
the traditional approach, but applied other devices to apply the preferable substantive
rule).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1971).
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insisted that the entire venture was counterproductive and should be
abandoned."1
The various twists and turns taken in the drafting of the Second
Restatement are well documented in the American Law Institute pro-
ceedings, as well as being discernable from its various tentative drafts
of the Second Restatement. In general terms, it is apparent that the Sec-
ond Restatement began as one kind of project and ended as another.
To understand how this came about, it is necessary to return to the
Second Restatement's nominal predecessor.
The first Restatement of Conflict of Laws19 was begun in 1923 under
the leadership of Reporter and Harvard law professor Joseph Beale.
20
The American Law Institute's aim in drafting the First Restatement
was-as it was for other restatements-to produce an "orderly state-
ment of the general common law of the United States. '2 1 In that
sense, the First Restatement was a reasonably successful enterprise. For
the most part, it accurately restated American law as it then existed.
While there was apparently fairly broad agreement on the state-
ment of the rules in the First Restatement, Beale's theory-and thus his
explanation for the rules-was controversial even then.22 For this rea-
son, the First Restatement's drafters eliminated a good deal of the ex-
planatory material, resulting in commentary that the Reporter for the
Second Restatement, Professor Willis Reese, accurately described as
"terse."23 Although eliminating the controversial explanatory material
might have been expedient, it resulted in a document more dogmatic
than perhaps even Beale wanted.
The First Restatement's dogmatic character, combined with the
devastating criticisms launched by David Cavers,24 Walter Wheeler
Cook,25 Hessel Yntema, 26 Ernest Lorenzen 2 ' and others foretold its
18. See Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754,
755 (1963) ("We certainly do not need a new Restatement, although we are threatened with
one."); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts:
Law and Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 28 Law & CONTEMP. PROBS. 700, 700 (1963)
("Only the remaining hope to induce the Restaters to withdraw their latest draft on the
conflicts law of torts has prompted me to offer these comments.
19. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1934).
20. See Reese, supra note 2, at 679.
21. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS viii (1934).
22. See Reese, supra note 2, at 679-80.
23. Id. at 679.
24. See supra note 7.
25. See WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAws ix (1942) (analogizing the dogma of the First Restatement to a "rank weed" and stating
that "until the intellectual garden is freed of the rank weeds in question useful vegetables
cannot grow and flourish").
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short life. The academic criticism of its underpinnings, coupled with
judicial deviation from some of its categorically stated rules, put it at
the head of the line for revision. In the beginning, the Second Restate-
ment's drafters apparently did not envision a work radically different
from the original. They still wanted a document that "restated" the
existing law in the United States.
2 3
When work began in 1952, that hope must not have seemed too
far out of reach. After all, 1952 was the year before Grant v. McAu-
liffe,29 two years before Auten v. Auten, ° nine years before Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc.,1 eleven years before Babcock v. Jackson,3 2 fifteen
years before Reich v. Purcell," and well in advance of the countless
other cases that spawned the conflicts revolution. The revolution,
however, rendered the conflicts law of the United States incapable of
restatement. The diversity of new approaches destroyed any possibil-
ity of a coherent statement of the "general common law" that the First
Restatement sought to reflect.3 '4 By the late 1960s, it was probably no
more possible to "restate" choice-of-law doctrine than it was to "re-
state" the law of zoning or child support.
Moreover, even the task of "restating" the law of a single state
might have become impossible. For instance, in the span of six years,
the New York Court of Appeals decided that in guest-host cases the
26. See Hessel E. Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468,
474 (1928) (describing the First Restatement's method of dealing with conflict of laws as
"superficial," "unscientific," and "quite inadequate").
27. See Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE
L.J. 736, 748 (1924) (describing the First Restatement's covert mode of approach to the
conflict of laws as an a posteriori approach).
28. See Reese, supra note 2, at 680.
29. 264 P.2d 944, 949 (Cal. 1953) (in bank) (holding that the issue of survival of a
cause of action is a question of procedural law, and thus is governed by the law of the
forum).
30. 124 N.E.2d 99, 103 (N.Y. 1954) (emphasizing "the law of the place with the most
significant contacts" in a contract dispute, rather than relying upon the conventional rule
"that matters of performance and breach are governed by the law of the place of
performance").
31. 172 N.E.2d 526, 529 (N.Y. 1961) (holding that the public policy interests of New
York prevented application of another state's damage limitation in a wrongful death action
and treating the measure of damages as a procedural question controlled by the laws of the
forum state).
32. 191 NE.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1963) (concluding that, in tort cases with multistate
contacts, justice and fairness may best be achieved "by giving controlling effect to the law of
the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the
parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation").
33. 432 P.2d 727, 729 (Cal. 1967) (in bank) (noting that "when application of the law
of the place of the wrong would defeat the interests of the litigant and of the states con-
cerned," the court should not apply that law).
34. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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law of the state of common domicile of the guest and host should,35
then should not,36 then should3 7 apply. This prompted Maurice Ro-
senberg's famous assertion that "[a] New York lawyer with a guest stat-
ute case has more need of an ouija board... than a copy of Shepard's
citations. "3
8
With or without an ouija board, the attempt to restate the law
continued. The pressures of the nineteen years that intervened be-
tween the conception and birth of the Second Restatement produced a
document that could not-and cannot-be fairly called a "restate-
ment" of anything. Instead, it is an amalgamation of different con-
flicts approaches, producing a document of a distinctly normative
character. Nowhere is this normative character more evident than in
section 6 and its juxtaposition with other provisions in the document.
Yet the territorial, multilateral tradition of its predecessor still
shows in the Second Restatement, which its Reporter would describe as
"eclectic and territorial."39 The objections of Currie and Ehrenzweig
appear, as much as anything else, to have been directed at this territo-
rialist bent-especially in its earlier drafts.4" The attempt to accom-
modate their objections produced section 6, which one writer
somewhat uncharitably described as "a sop tossed... to members of
the American Law Institute who were unhappy with a purely territorial
methodology."4
As uncharitable as this characterization might be, there is no de-
nying its accuracy. As is well known, section 6's list of "factors rele-
vant" to the choice include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and
the relative interests of those states in the determination of
the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of
law,
35. Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 284-85.
36. See Dym v. Gordon, 209 N.E.2d 792, 794-95 (N.Y. 1965).
37. See Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394, 398-402 (N.Y. 1969).
38. Maurice Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson: An Opinion for the New York
Court of Appeals, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 459, 460 (1967).
39. Willis L.M. Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited, 34 MERCER L.
REv. 501, 507 (1983).
40. See supra note'18 and accompanying text.
41. William A. Reppy, Jr., Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?, 34
MER ER L. REv. 645, 662 (1983).
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(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law
to be applied.42
In structure, this list much resembles others compiled by academic
authors, including the one by Elliott Cheatham and Willis Reese. 3 A
notable omission, however, is any explicit reference to "'justice in the
individual case"' or any similar consideration.44 Even as late as 1963,
Reese insisted that individualized justice was an appropriate concern
in multistate cases, which he explained with the observation that "no
judge will willingly reach a result which he deems to be unjust."45 The
absence in section 6 of any explicit reference to such a consideration
is also the major distinction between the Second Restatement's list and
the one proffered by Professor Leflar, who included "[t] he better rule
of law" as the fifth of five coequal factors.46
Whether or not the "better rule" is explicitly made a factor, sec-
tion 6 gives almost unlimited discretion to a court in choosing the
applicable law.4 7 Moreover, the factors often pull in opposite direc-
tions. A rule that protects justified expectations, for instance, may not
be the easiest to apply. Application of the rule that promotes the fo-
rum's policies may not lead to predictability and uniformity of result.
Of course, section 6 is but one of many provisions in the Second
Restatement. It coexists with numerous other sections more in the
mold of the First Restatement and the earlier, more rigidly territorial,
Second Restatement drafts. An examination of the tort chapter is illus-
trative. The tort chapter begins with section 145, a section nearly as
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 34 (1971).
43. See Elliott E. Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM.
L. REv. 959, 961 (1952) (listing the following as "at least some of the major policies under-
lying choice of law": (1) the needs of the interstate and international systems; (2) applica-
tion of local law unless there is a good reason for not doing so; (3) effectuating the
purpose of relevant local law; (4) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result; (5)
protecting justified expectations; (6) applying the law of the state of dominant interest; (7)
convenience and ease in determining applicable law; (8) the fundamental policy underly-
ing the broad local law field involved; and (9) justice in the individual case).
44. See Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 772,
817 & n.6 (1983) (quoting Cheatham & Reese, supra note 43, at 980-81, and commenting
that individualized justice is "[n]otably omitted from section 6").
45. Reese, supra note 2, at 690.
46. Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Laws: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L.
REv. 1584, 1585-88 (1966); see also Reppy, supra note 41, at 657-58 (commenting that "the
addition of section 6 makes the Restatement Second's choice of law methodology a 'hy-
brid' of territorialism and 'Leflar's five factor test"' (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Keyser,
275 S.E.2d 289, 295 (W. Va. 1981))).
47. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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amorphous as section 6.48 Section 145 begins with the nearly useless
admonition that tort issues are to be determined so as to choose the
law that "has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and
the parties under the principles stated in § 6."" Section 145 then lists
four different groups of " [c]ontacts to be taken into account in apply-
ing the principles of § 6. "5o These contacts are the place of the injury,
the place of the injury-causing conduct, the "domicil, residence, na-
tionality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties,"
and "the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.""1 Section 145 then concludes with the precatory statement
that the contacts "are to be evaluated according to their relative im-
portance with respect to the particular issue. "52
Thus, section 145 is no more definite than section 6, and perhaps
even less so. On top of the "factors" listed in section 6, section 145
adds a generous dollop of territorial and personal contacts. Once one
ventures past section 145, however, the chapter dramatically changes
character. Instead of infinitely open-ended sections, the Second Re-
statement, for the most part, articulates reasonably definite rules. To
be sure, these succeeding sections contain escape valves that refer to
section 6. Many of the rules echo the First Restatement's preference
for choosing the law of the injury state.54 Others do not refer to the
injury state directly, but choose connecting factors very likely, if not
certain, to lead to the application of the law of the injury state.55 A
few presumptively choose the place of the defendant's conduct, the
domicile of one or both parties, or some other reasonably definite
48. See Friedrich Juenger, Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 202, 212
(1969) ("Although it is printed in black letters, section 145 is not much of a rule ....
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAwS § 145 (1971).
50. Id. § 145(2).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., id. § 146 ("In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state
where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with
respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under
the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law
of the other state will be applied.").
54. See id. §§ 146 (Personal Injuries); 147 (Injuries to Tangible Things); 156 (Tortious
Character of Conduct); 157 (Standard of Care); 158 (Interest Entitled to Legal Protec-
tion); 159 (Duty Owed Plaintiff); 160 (Legal Cause); 162 (Specific Conditions of Liability);
164 (Contributory Fault); 165 (Assumption of Risk); 166 (Imputed Negligence); 172 (Joint
Torts); 175 (Right of Action for Death); 176 (Defenses); 177 (Beneficiaries: How Damages
Distributed); 178 (Damages); 179 (Person to Bring Suit); 180 (Personal Representative to
Bring Suit).
55. See id. §§ 148 (Fraud and Misrepresentation); 149 (Defamation); 150 (Multistate
Defamation); 151 (Injurious Falsehood); 152 (Right of Privacy); 153 (Multistate Invasion
of Privacy); 155 (Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process).
1997] 1239
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
connection.5 6 Only a relatively few sections refer solely to the general
formula of section 145 without providing some presumptive choice.5 7
More could be said about the dynamics of drafting the Second Re-
statement and its overall structure. My point is simple, however. The
forces that contorted choice of law between 1952 and 1971 resulted in
a schizophrenic Second Restatement. One portion of its split personality
is vague sections such as 6 and 145.58 The other portion is a set of
reasonably definite rules and a preference for territorial solutions, in-
cluding the injury-state rule for tort cases, endorsed by its
predecessor.59
II. THE SECOND PtESTA TEMEA'T As APPLIED
In applying the Second Restatement, one might speculate that
courts would fall into one of two patterns. One possibility is that they
might rely heavily on the relatively narrow, presumptive rules in the
Second Restatement and largely ignore the general sections such as 6
and 145. The second is that courts might refer primarily to the gen-
eral sections and largely ignore the specific ones. In theory, of course,
a court following the Second Restatement might attempt to do both, but
this seems unlikely. The general sections and the specific sections
represent fundamentally different approaches to choice of law. The
general sections are the embodiment of a free-form approach to
choice of law, whereas the specific sections are quite close to the mul-
tilateral system embodied by the First Restatement.
There is already a good deal of evidence that courts take the free-
form approach. At least two recent empirical studies of choice-of-law
decisions examine the frequency with which reported cases are de-
cided in favor of plaintiffs or defendants, local or foreign parties, and
forum or foreign law.6 ° Both studies confirm the observation that the
modern theories are "pro-resident, pro-forum-law, and pro-recov-
ery."61 While states adhering to the First Restatement choose pro-resi-
56. See id. §§ 150 (Multistate Defamation); 151 (Injurious Falsehood); 154 (Interfer-
ence with Marriage Relationship); 155 (Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process); 162
(Specific Conditions of Liability); 169 (Intra-Family Immunity).
57. See id. §§ 161 (Defenses); 167 (Survival of Actions); 168 (Charitable Immunity); 170
(Release or Covenant Not to Sue); 171 (Damages); 173 (Contribution and Indemnity
Among Tortfeasors); 174 (Vicarious Liability).
58. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
60. See PatrickJ. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 357 (1992); Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of
Law, 24 GA. L. REv. 49 (1988).
61. Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REv. 392,
398 (1980).
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dent, pro-forum law and pro-recovery rules fairly infrequently, all of
the modern theories do so with considerable frequency. 62
If courts followed the narrow provisions of the Second Restatement,
their result patterns should be closer to the First Restatement than to
the major competing modern methodologies; neither interest analysis
nor Leflar's approach gives much weight to territorial connections,
and little weight to the place of the injury in tort cases.63 Empirical
analysis shows, however, that, with one minor exception, the Second
Restatement's performance is statistically identical to that of the other
modern approaches.64 This suggests that Second Restatement states are
inclined to rely on the general, not the specific, sections.
There is other evidence that the general sections in the Second
Restatement are the most important. Even a cursory examination of
judicial opinions relying on the Second Restatement reveals that they
often proceed without examining any of the specific provisions in the
Second Restatement. The New York Court of Appeals decision in Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Stolarz65 offers a good example. Stolarz dealt with a
two-car, New York automobile accident and focused on whether to
apply New York or NewJersey law to a question of whether the policy-
holder's uninsured motorist coverage should be stacked on top of the
coverage afforded by the other driver's policy.66 NewJersey law would
not have allowed such stacking;67 New York law apparently would
have.6" New York's high court attempted to answer the conflicts ques-
tion by reference to section 188-the Second Restatement's general con-
tracts section-and applied NewJersey law.69 Nowhere did the court
refer to section 193, the section dealing with casualty insurance.
62. See Borchers, supra note 60, at 374-75 (applying a binary statistical method to show
totals for each approach); Solimine, supra note 60, at 50 (stating that "the modem ap-
proaches are usually 'pro-resident, pro-forum-law, [and] pro-recovery'" (quoting
Brilmayer, supra note 61, at 398)).
63. See Borchers, supra note 60, at 361-67 (discussing the conflicts revolution and the
analytical arguments therein).
64. See id. at 377-79. The minor exception is that the ninety-five percent confidence
intervals for Second Restatement and Leflar states do not overlap with regard to the applica-
tion of pro-recovery rules. See id. at 378. All other ninety-five percent confidence intervals
overlap.
65. 613 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1993).
66. Id. at 936-37.
67. Id. at 937.
68. Id. Although the New York Court of Appeals applied NewJersey law, its alternative
rationale was to distinguish and limit the New York case, United Community Insurance Co. v.
Mucatel, 487 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1985), affd without opinion, 501 N.Y.S.2d
761 (App. Div. 1986), affdfor reason stated by trial court, 505 N.E.2d 624 (N.Y. 1987), which
apparently allowed for the stacking. Stolarz, 613 N.E.2d at 938.
69. Stolarz, 613 N.E.2d at 939.
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Closer inspection of that section would have revealed an illustration
specifically dealing with the problem facing the Stolarz court.7v
Although the court's result was consistent with the illustration, the
court appeared to be completely unaware that section 193 or its illus-
trations even existed.71
Stolarz is anecdotal evidence that courts view general sections of
the Second Restatement as the ones that really matter. There remains,
however, the question of whether the anecdotal impression can be
confirmed empirically. Using LEXIS, I set out to measure the fre-
quency with which courts cite to various sections of the Second Restate-
ment.72 First, I collected data on how often some of the general
sections in the Second Restatement have been cited. The results are cor-
related in the following Table.
TABLE I
FREQUENCY OF CITATION TO GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE
SECOND RESTA TEMEVT
RESTATEMENT NUMBER OF
SEcrION Topic OF SECTION CASES CITING
6 Choice-of-Law Principles 523
145 The General Principle (Torts) 610
187 Law of the State Chosen by the Parties 330
188 Law Governing in the Absence of Effective 494
Choice by the Parties (Contracts)
6 and 145 Cited Tort Considerations 210
Together in the
Same Case
6 and 188 Cited Contract Considerations 94
Together in the
Same Case
70. This aspect of Stolarz is discussed in Patrick J. Borchers, New York Choice of Law:
Weaving the Tangled Strands, 57 ALB. L. REv. 93, 109-11 (1993), wherein the author argues
that courts should look to the Second Restatement's narrow rules rather than just to the
general provisions.
71. See id. at 110-11.
72. I ran the searches on November 16, 1996. When searching for citations to section
6, for example, I entered the following search in the MEGA, MEGA library: "(Restatement
w/4 Conflict w/4 Law w/4 Section) w/4 6." For other sections I substituted the appropri-
ate number for 6 in the above search. Undoubtedly, this search routine produced some
false positives. For instance, if another citation-such as a case citation-used the number
6 in close proximity to another citation to the Second Restatement, that combination would
satisfy the search criteria. However, narrowing the search by using "w/1" as the connector
for the section number, for instance, would have excluded some citations to multiple sec-
tions of the Second Restatement. In any event, individually checking a large number of the
citations revealed that the vast majority of them were not false positives; they were in fact
citations to the sought-after Second Restatement provision.
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As one might expect, given the large number of states purporting
to follow the Second Restatement, the general sections have been cited
quite often. The most popular section is 145, which is not surprising
given that tort cases pose most of the difficulties in the postrevolution-
ary period.7" Next in frequency of citation is section 6, the most gen-
eral section.
Having ascertained the raw number of cases citing the most gen-
eral sections of the Second Restatement, I set out to compare their fre-
quency of citation to the frequency of citation of the more specific
sections in the Second Restatement. The following Table correlates the
data for the tort sections.
TABLE II
FREQUENCY OF CITATION TO TORT PROVISIONS OF THE
SECOND RIESTA TMEA,"T
NUMBER
RESTATEMENT OF CASES
SECTION Topic OF SECTION CITING
145 The General Principle (Torts) 610
146 Personal Injuries 120
147 Injuries to Tangible Things 14
148 Fraud and Misrepresentation 43
149 Defamation 20
150 Multistate Defamation 42
151 Injurious Falsehood 3
152 Right of Privacy 6
153 Multistate Invasion of Privacy 7
154 Interference with Marriage Relationship 2
155 Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process 11
156 Tortious Character of Conduct 2
157 Standard of Care 2
158 Interest Entitled to Legal Protection 2
159 Duty Owed Plaintiff 1
160 Legal Cause 4
161 Defenses 3
162 Specific Conditions of Liability 1
163 Duty or Privilege to Act 5
164 Contributory Fault 4
170 Release or Covenant Not to Sue 10
171 Damages 25
73. See Borchers, supra note 60, at 369.
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NUMBER
RESTATEMENT OF CASES
SECTION Topic OF SECTION CITING
172 Joint Torts 1
173 Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors 12
174 Vicarious Liability 2
175 Right of Action for Death 52
176 Defenses (Wrongful Death) 3
177 Beneficiaries: How Damages Distributed 5
(Wrongful Death)
178 Damages (Wrongful Death) 10
179 Person to Bring Suit (Wrongful Death) 1
180 Personal Representative to Bring Suit (Wrongful 0
Death)
Total Citations 435
to Specific Tort
Provisions
Total Citations 315
to Specific Tort
Provisions
Excluding § 146
As one might expect, section 145 is cited with much greater fre-
quency than any other tort section. In fact, section 145 has been cited
more than five times as often as the next most popular section, section
146. Moreover, section 146's status as the second most popular sec-
tion correlates with its generality. Section 146 covers all matters of
"personal injury," a large subset of torts."4 After section 146, no other
section has been cited in more than fifty-two cases, and twenty-five of
the sections have been cited in ten or fewer cases. Even more striking,
however, is that the total citations to specific tort sections of the Second
Restatement is only 71.3% of the citations to section 145. If one ex-
cludes section 146, the total becomes a mere 51.6% of the citations to
section 145.
A similar pattern emerges with regard to contracts cases, which
are correlated in the next table.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (Personal Injuries) (1971).
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TABLE III
FREQUENCY OF CITATION TO CONTRACTS PROVISIONS OF THE
Second Restatement
NUMBER
RESTATEMENT OF CASES
SECTION Topic OF SECTION CITING
188 Law Governing (Contracts) 494
189 Contracts for the Transfer of Interests in Land 20
190 Contractual Duties Arising from Transfer of 2
Interests in Land
191 Contracts to Sell Interests in Chattel 14
192 Life Insurance Contracts 30
193 Contracts of Fire, Surety or Casualty Insurance 127
194 Contracts of Suretyship 15
195 Contracts for the Repayment of Money Lent 5
196 Contracts for the Rendition of Services 28
197 Contracts of Transportation 2
198 Capacity to Contract 3
199 Requirements of a Writing-Formalities 12
200 Validity of a Contract in Respects Other Than 0
Capacity and Formalities
201 Misrepresentation, Duress, Undue Influence and 12
Mistake
202 Illegality 14
203 Usury 31
204 Construction of Words Used in Contract 5
205 Nature and Extent of Contractual Obligations 6
206 Details of Performance 8
207 Measure of Recovery 23
Total Citations 385
to Specific
Contracts
Provisions
As with tort cases, no specific section approaches the popularity
of the general provision-section 188. The next most popular provi-
sion is section 193, which has been cited in 127 cases. Beyond that, no
section has been cited in more than thirty-one cases. When one totals
all of the cases citing specific contracts sections, the resulting amount
is 385 cases, which is only 77.9% of the number of cases citing the
general section.
This suggests that cases like Stolarz are fairly common. One possi-
ble explanation for the numerous cases citing the general sections
might be that no specific section covers the problem before the court.
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This seems unlikely, however, given the wide array of specific sections.
The more plausible explanation appears to be that there are a large
number of cases to which specific sections might apply, but courts ig-
nore them in favor of the general sections.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Over time, the Second Restatement has become something different
from the document it appears to be. Even the courts that claim to
adhere to the Second Restatement most likely do not look at it very often.
Moreover, courts' indifference to the Second Restatement causes counsel
to ignore it. Instead, courts and the attorneys practicing before them
look to cases quoting sections 6, 145, 188, or some of the other popu-
lar provisions. They content themselves with block quotations of
those general sections and then proceed to solve the choice-of-law
problem, considering only those general sections. Forjudges and law-
yers, the Second Restatement exists not as a handsome, two-volume book
authored by the American Law Institute, but rather as a kind of chain
letter consisting of selective block quotations.
For many courts, this chain-letter approach is comfortable. The
"official" status of the Second Restatement is more attractive than at-
tempting to follow theories developed in law review articles that by
now are thirty or more years old.7" The eclectic mix of territorial and
personal connecting factors allows a court to claim that almost any
result is consistent with the Second Restatement. Given the Second Re-
statement's schizophrenic character, the advent of such a chain-letter
approach should have been foreseeable, but hardly intended by its
drafters, who gave it a much more definite, territorial cast than that
followed by Second Restatement courts.
Self-described Second Restatement states should reexamine their ap-
proach. If they find themselves routinely departing from the pre-
sumptive choices set forth in the narrower sections, they ought to
renounce their alleged adherence to the Second Restatement. "Follow-
ing" the Second Restatement ought to mean something other than a ritu-
alized citation to sections 6 and 145. If courts actually began to follow
the Second Restatement, however, they might well find themselves reach-
ing unpalatable results. The fact that a court finds these results unac-
ceptable should indicate that it is not really a Second Restatement court.
75. See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Method, 25 U. CHi. L. REv. 227 (1958) (discussing various ways to resolve conflicts of inter-
est between states); Leflar, supra note 46, at 1585-88 (analyzing the principles and policy
considerations that judges use in resolving conflict of laws).
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Courts that find themselves in this position ought to consider en-
dorsing Professor Leflar's approach. 76 His explicit recognition that
the relative quality of the competing rules is an important considera-
tion in making choice-of-law decisions makes his list a more accurate
"restatement" of what courts actually do. 77
In any event, making a serious effort to consider the entire Second
Restatement would improve the quality of judicial decisionmaking.
Courts that are willing to follow the narrow rules of the Second Restate-
ment would derive vastly more guidance than that which can be
gleaned from sections 6, 145, and 188. Courts unwilling to adhere
generally to its narrow rules should renounce the claim that they are
Second Restatement states and candidly state their true preferences.
76. See Leflar, supra note 46, at 1585-88.
77. See id.
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